Commonwealth v. Wiggs, 2026 PA Super 126 — A Wrong Decision, and the Fight to Reverse It

2026 PA Super 126 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA

v. : STEVEN AHMAD WIGGS :

Appellant : No. 641 MDA 2023 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 3, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Perry County Criminal Division at No: CP-50-SA-0000026-2021 BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and BECK, J. DISSENTING OPINION BY STABILE, J.: FILED: JUNE 17, 2026 The very narrow issue in this case is whether Appellant, a constable, could be cited for violating section 4571(d) of the Motor Vehicle Code (“MVC”)1

due to having flashing red and blue lights mounted on his vehicle, when such lights are only permitted on specified “emergency vehicles,” as defined in the MVC.2 This issue of statutory interpretation only requires us to apply the clear and unambiguous language of the MVC to the facts at hand. Respectfully, I believe the Majority has improperly applied the rules of statutory construction it relies upon. The Majority’s approach ignores plain statutory definitions and cherry-picks inapplicable exceptions, thwarting legislative intent. Since the MVC permits Appellant to equip his vehicle with red and blue emergency lights under sections 102 and 4571 of the MVC, I would vacate Appellant’s judgment of sentence on that ground.

Constables are “police officers” as defined by section 102 of the MVC

On June 15, 2021, Appellant was serving as a constable. Red and blue lights were mounted on the roof of his vehicle as he drove through Perry County. While on patrol, a state trooper pulled over Appellant and cited him for a violation of section 4571 of the MVC. This statute provides that the type of visual warning system Appellant had installed is only authorized for “emergency vehicles.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4571(d). An “emergency vehicle” is defined under section 102 of the MVC to include a “police vehicle.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 102. In turn, a “police officer” is defined in that same section as “[a] natural person authorized by law to make arrests for violations of law.” Id. (emphasis added).

The Majority, in its limited discussion of section 102, insinuates that constables are not “police officers” under that provision because they have common law arrest powers, and more limited arrest powers than other types of peace officers. See Maj. Op., at 10-14. Yet, the Majority recognizes that a constable’s authority to “make arrests for violations of law” does not arise from the common law, as it does for sheriffs and ordinary citizens. See id., at 11. The Majority begrudgingly seems to agree that, under a strict and plain reading of section 102, a constable satisfies the MVC’s definition of a “police officer.” See id.

Indeed, in section 102, the MVC defines a “police officer” as someone who has statutory authority (“by law”) to make arrests, which constables

notably have, see 44 Pa.C.S.A. § 7158(1)-(3), and sheriffs and ordinary citizens notably lack. See 16 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 13701-13715 (Sheriff); see also Kopko v. Miller, 892 A.2d 766, 773-74 (Pa. 2006) (emphasizing that sheriffs have common law power “to make warrantless arrests for breaching of the peace committed in their presence,” but holding that, due to the absence of “legislative authority” to make arrests, they are not authorized to conduct wiretapping under 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5701-5781).

As was made evident by the General Assembly, the powers and duties conferred upon constables are limited to those which are legislatively granted. See 44 Pa.C.S.A. § 7151 (“Constables shall perform all duties authorized or imposed on them by statute.”). A number of statutory powers are expressly granted to constables, many of which involve the use of force to carry out the law. See generally 44 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 7101-7178. Constables are authorized “to carry or use firearms in the performance of any duties.” 44 Pa.C.S.A. § 7148 (emphasis added). Constables are statutorily authorized to oversee and preserve the peace at elections held in their jurisdictions (44 Pa.C.S.A. § 7152), and investigate complaints of a violation of law when directed to do so by a court (44 Pa.C.S.A. § 7157).

Constables also are statutorily authorized to make warrantless arrests in their boroughs for observed violations of law, such as breaches of the peace, and “any unlawful act tending to imperil the personal security or endanger the property of the citizens.” 44 Pa.C.S.A. § 7158. Constables are permitted,

“upon view,” to make a warrantless “arrest” of any person who “[v]iolates any ordinance of the borough for which a fine or penalty is imposed.” Id. They may also direct traffic, and motorists are required to comply. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3102.3 Accordingly, Appellant could mount red and blue emergency lights on his vehicle because he was authorized by law to make arrests for violations of law. This qualified Appellant as a “police officer,” as that term is unequivocally defined in section 102 of the MVC, making his vehicle a “police vehicle” and therefore an “emergency vehicle” for purposes of section 4571.

Although our inquiry should end there, I am compelled to elaborate further on why I believe the Majority’s treatment of these statutory provisions is in error.

“Clear and free from all ambiguity”

“When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921. Our Supreme Court has likewise mandated that, “where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, a court may not add matters the legislature saw fit not to include under the guise of construction.”

Mohamed v. Commonwealth Dep't of Transp., 40 A.3d 1186, 1194–95 (Pa. 2012); see also A.S. v. Penn. State Police, 143 A.3d 896, 903 (Pa. 2016) (“It is only when statutory text is determined to be ambiguous that we may go beyond the text and look to other considerations to discern legislative intent.”).

The provisions now being examined, sections 102 and 4571, are plain and unambiguous. As the Majority apparently concedes, see Maj. Op., at 12- 13, a constable must fit the MVC’s definition of a “police officer” because he or she is “authorized by law to make arrests for violations of law,” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 102, and this authorization is derived not from common law, but rather from legislative enactment. See generally Commonwealth v. Marconi, 64 A.3d 1036, 1041 (Pa. 2013) (explaining that ordinary citizens and sheriffs are not “police officers” under this definition because their arrest power is derived solely from common law, rather than “some form of legal authorization”).

Section 4571 contains no alternative definitions or express exclusions of individuals who may qualify as a “police officer.” See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4571. Nothing in the context of section 4571 or the MVC as a whole would “clearly” suggest that, with respect to that specific statute, “police officer” was intended to have a different meaning than the one provided in section 102. Section 4571 does not state that a “police vehicle” must be owned by any particular entity or operated by any one of the many types of police officers in the Commonwealth. See e.g., 53 Pa.C.S.A. 2162 (Municipal Code definitions

section recognizing over a dozen types of “police officer,” each of which has its own duties, training requirements, and statutory authorization).

I note further that an individual need not have plenary arrest powers to qualify as a “police officer” under the MVC’s definition in section 102; all that is needed is some degree of arrest powers, as authorized by law, and it cannot seriously be disputed that constables have such authorization. A constable, then, is a “police officer” for the purposes of section 4571, and his vehicle is a “police vehicle,” which may have red and blue emergency lights mounted on it.

The Majority attempts to shift the focus away from this plain reading by determining – without citation to any legal authority – that section 4571 only “pertains to certain classes of vehicles, not to the categories of drivers.” Maj. Op., at 10. In so doing, the Majority relegates Appellant’s vehicle to the status of a “constable vehicle,” a term which appears nowhere in the MVC. The Majority further distinguishes between “police vehicles” and “privately-owned vehicles.” Finally, the Majority differentiates police officers from constables by classifying the latter as “independent contractors.” See Maj. Op., at 7-9.

By pivoting away from the plain text of sections 102 and 4571 in this manner, the Majority overlooks that these are penal statutes, which must be strictly construed. Unless the MVC says otherwise, it is ultimately the status of the person who drives the vehicle which necessarily determines whether emergency lights are authorized. See generally Commonwealth v.

Rodriguez, 81 A.3d 103 (Pa. Super. 2013) (holding that status of constables as “not employees of the Commonwealth” was the dispositive fact which refuted contention that constable’s personal vehicle was an exempt “government vehicle” for purposes of the window tinting statute, section 4524 of the MVC).

The language of sections 102 or 4571 contains no clear context which would lead one to surmise that “police vehicle” can refer to anything other than a vehicle operated by a “police officer” while carrying out official duties. The MVC’s list of emergency vehicles simply provides that a “police vehicle” is one of the types of vehicle that falls into that category for purposes of the title. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 102.

The General Assembly could have easily stated that a “police vehicle” qualifies as such depending on its public ownership, just as it did with various other types of conveyance in the same list which were described in that fashion. See generally id. The absence of a public ownership requirement for a “police vehicle” establishes that its omission was intentional. See Mimi Investors, LLC v. Tufano, 397 A.3d 1272, 1286 (Pa. 2023) (declining to construe a statute as impliedly containing a scienter requirement, in part because “the Legislature employed the language of scienter in several other material provisions of [the Pennsylvania Securities Act], further reinforcing the notion that the absence of scienter language in Section 1-401(b) was intentional.”).

Moreover, it makes perfect sense why “constable vehicle” is not expressly enumerated as an “emergency vehicle” in sections 102 or 4571 – it would have been redundant because constables fit the MVC’s general definition of “police officer” in section 102. Assuming, as we must, that a constable is a “police officer,” and that thier vehicle is a “police vehicle,” there was no need for “constable vehicle” to be listed separately.

As to a constable’s employment status, I question the import of the Majority’s reference to them as “independent contractors.” A constable is an elected official who holds a public office limited by term. See generally 44 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 7101-7178 (Constables). Our Supreme Court, in In re Act 147 of 1990, found it relevant that constables are “independent contractors” only insofar as that status meant they are not “employees” of the judicial branch, making them belong instead “analytically to the executive branch of government[.]” In re Act 147 of 1990, 598 A.2d 985, 990 (Pa. 1991).

In that same opinion, our Supreme Court stated that “[t]he constable is a police officer.” Id., at 990 n.3 (emphasis added). The Court explained that, as an executive branch member, “[i]t is the constable's job to enforce the law and carry it out, just as the same is the job of district attorneys, sheriffs, and the police generally[.]” Id., at 990. This description of constables doing the job of “the police generally” directly contradicts the Majority’s suggestion that a person’s status as an “independent contractor” somehow makes them not a “police officer.” See id.

Thus, Appellant should prevail under a straightforward application of statutory and decisional law, and the lack of ambiguity in these provisions makes it improper for the Majority to engage in any further statutory interpretation or construction. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b). By affirming the judgment of sentence, the Majority has declined to “effectuate the intention of the General Assembly” and disregarded the letter of the MVC “under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” Id.; see also Mimi, 297 A.3d at 1285 (“It is only upon a finding that a statute's terms are ambiguous that we turn away from the text to ascertain legislative intent by other means.”).

The Rule of Lenity

Only an ambiguity in the language of sections 102 and 4571 would justify the Majority’s resort to applying rules of statutory construction to ascertain legislative intent. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1921(b), 1933. In the event of such an ambiguity, the Majority would be foreclosed from adopting an interpretation that is unfavorable to Appellant.

“[W]hile statutes generally should be construed liberally, penal statutes are always to be construed strictly, 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1928(b)(1), and any ambiguity in a penal statute should be interpreted in favor of the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Simmons, 262 A.3d 512, 516 (Pa. Super. 2021) (en banc) (emphasis added). “A statute is ambiguous when there are at least two reasonable interpretations of the text.” A.S., 143 A.3d at 906.

To determine whether statutory language is plain or ambiguous, it must be read in the specific and general context in which it is used. See id.

“In reading the plain language, ‘[w]ords and phrases shall be construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage,’ while any words or phrases that have acquired a ‘peculiar and appropriate meaning’ must be construed according to that meaning.” Commonwealth v. Shiffler, 879 A.2d 185, 189 (Pa. 2005) (citing 1 Pa.C.S.A. 1903(a)).

Here, the statutory language in section 102 and 4571 is clear and unambiguous, in that they would authorize Appellant to mount emergency lights on his vehicle. Appellant is a constable who is “authorized by law to make arrests for violations of law,” making him a “police officer,” as that term is defined in the MVC. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 102.

Under sections 102 and 4571, a “police vehicle” is categorized as an “emergency vehicle” on which red and blue emergency lights may be mounted. The MVC provides no further guidance as to how these specific provisions are to be construed. Significantly, these statutes do not specifically exclude constables or their vehicles from qualifying as a “police officer” or a “police vehicle,” respectively. These provisions also coincide with the statement by our Supreme Court that a “constable is a police officer.” In re Act 147 of 1990, 598 A.2d at 990 n.3. It was therefore reasonable for Appellant to interpret the MVC as authorizing him to mount emergency lights

on his vehicle, and the rule of lenity requires this Court to adopt that reasonable interpretation in the event of an ambiguity.

The Majority ignores the rule of lenity even in its opinion where it supposes, “in the alternative,” that the statutes under review are ambiguous. See Maj. Op., at 22. The law is clear, though, that if sections 102 and 4571 are found not to be explicit, then Appellant’s reasonable interpretation must be adopted.

The Majority applies rules of construction, not interpretation

Even if we were permitted to ignore or go beyond the plain meaning of the statutes now under review, disregard the rule of lenity, and apply rules of statutory construction, the Majority’s reasoning still does not hold up to scrutiny.

In its opinion, the Majority states repeatedly that sections 102 and 4571 of the MVC are both clear and unambiguous. Yet the Majority is only able to glean the General Assembly’s supposed intent by assuming that the General Assembly meant something other than what its enactments state. These are irreconcilable positions.

Among the rules of construction employed by the Majority are consideration of the other statutes upon the same or similar subjects, the consequences of particular interpretations, and the object to be attained by

the statutes’ enactment. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(c)(4)-(6).4 The General Assembly has mandated that its intention may only be ascertained by such considerations “[w]hen the words of the statute are not explicit[.]” 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(c). This Court has no authority, or need, to utilize those rules of construction for statutory language, like that in sections 102 and 4571, which is so patently clear. See id.5

The lynchpin of the Majority’s analysis is that section 4571 of the MVC was intended to prohibit constables from mounting emergency lights on their vehicles because, elsewhere in the MVC, constables are sometimes enumerated separately from police officers. See Maj. Op., at 12-19. The Majority infers that, for the purposes of section 4571, constables cannot be treated as police officers in accordance with the MVC’s general definition of “police officer” in section 102, and a constable’s vehicle therefore cannot qualify as a “police vehicle.” As previously discussed, the Majority concludes that “constables” have not been specifically authorized in section 4571 to mount red and blue flashing lights on their vehicles:

The absence of express authorization in § 4571(b)(1) for constable vehicles to use red and blue flashing lights is dispositive, as our High Court has explained that the omission of a particular alternative from a statute indicates that the legislature intended to exclude it. Maj. Op., at 7.

The Majority treats this supposed omission of “constables” from section 4571 as the smoking gun which proves their lack of authorization to mount emergency lights. But a smoking gun, it is not. Again, constables are expressly authorized in section 4571(b)(1) to mount emergency lights on their vehicles because they satisfy the MVC’s definition of “police officer.” See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 102.

Perhaps seeing the difficulty of its position – applying the rules of construction to unambiguous statutes – the Majority purports only to apply the doctrine, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, as a tool of statutory interpretation. However, I am unpersuaded that the Majority has truly managed to avoid the fundamental problem with its approach.

This doctrine of interpretation provides that "the inclusion of a specific matter in a statute implies the exclusion of other matters." Thompson v. Thompson, 223 A.3d 1272, 1277 (Pa. 2020). The doctrine has been applied in cases where, for example, one statute has expressly included a provision which has been omitted from a related statute:

[T]he Legislature explicitly authorized trial courts to sentence juvenile offenders to “life imprisonment without parole” for first- degree murder convictions under Section 1102.1(a) and excluded

this specific language from Section 1102.1(c) which relates to second-degree murder convictions, we decline to add language which the Legislature did not see fit to include. Had the Legislature intended to authorize trial courts to sentence juvenile offenders convicted of second-degree murder to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, it would have expressly done so. Commonwealth v. Sanchez-Frometa, 256 A.3d 440, 448 (Pa. Super. 2021) (emphasis added).

As discussed above, the present matter does not involve any omission of language in sections 102 and 4571 of the MVC. A constable already fits the MVC’s express definition of a “police officer” without the addition of any other language, so under a plain reading of sections 102 and 4571, a “police vehicle” must then encompass a constable’s vehicle, making it an “emergency vehicle.” The express enumeration of “police vehicle” in section 4571, absent some clear indication to the contrary, includes vehicles operated by constables in the course of their duties.

The doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius might arguably have come into play in the present case if the General Assembly had decided to restrict the use of emergency lights with greater specificity than it did in the MVC. By way of example, the General Local Government Code defines a “police officer” as

(1) A full-time or part-time employee assigned to criminal or traffic law enforcement duties of any of the following:

(i) A police department of a county, city, borough, town or township.

(ii) Any railroad or street railway police.

(iii) Any campus or university police department, including the State System of Higher Education and its member institutions.

(iv) The Capitol Police.

(v) The Harrisburg International Airport Police.

(vi) An airport authority police department.

(2) A deputy sheriff of a county of the second class.

(3) A security officer of a first class city housing authority or a police officer of a second class city housing authority.

(4) A county park police officer.

The term excludes persons employed to check parking meters or to perform only administrative duties and auxiliary and fire police. 53 Pa.C.S.A. 2162.

Constables do not fit into any of the enumerated categories in this list, so it could be argued that, under the doctrine, their omission could be read as intentional exclusion.

With respect to the MVC, the General Assembly could have easily defined a “police officer” in such a manner – had it wanted to. Rather than apply a detailed list based on an individual’s specific employer, title, or duties, see id., our legislature instead chose to define “police officer” broadly in a way that obviously includes constables. The General Assembly could have also decided to expressly exclude constables, but it did not do so. See e.g., id. (excluding “persons employed to check parking meters or to perform only administrative duties and auxiliary and fire police.”). Since constables satisfy

an express definition of “police officer” in the MVC, the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is simply not germane to the present case.6 The Majority’s method of comparing sections 102 and 4571 of the MVC to other provisions of that title is more akin to the rule of construction, “Particular controls general” (1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1933). The rule is unavailing, though, because it only applies where a statute is ambiguous, and further, application of the rule does not support the Majority’s holding.

If a specific legal rule irreconcilably conflicts with a general one, then the specific rule prevails only as an exception in a particular context, and only if the exception was enacted after the enactment of the general rule:

Whenever a general provision in a statute shall be in conflict with a special provision in the same or another statute, the two shall be construed, if possible, so that effect may be given to both. If the conflict between the two provisions is irreconcilable, the special provisions shall prevail and shall be construed as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision shall be enacted later and it shall be the manifest intention of the General Assembly that such general provision shall prevail.

1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1933 (emphasis added); see also 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1936 (“Whenever the provisions of two or more statutes enacted finally by different General Assemblies are irreconcilable, the statute latest in date of final enactment shall prevail.”). This is consistent with section 102 of the MVC, which makes its general definitions subject to “additional definitions contained in subsequent provisions of this title which are applicable to specific provisions of this title,” as well as “clear” context. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 102.

As the Majority notes, some provisions of the MVC list constables and police officers separately. See e.g., 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1376(b)(1), (5); 3102; 6309. However, these references in a few isolated and unrelated sections of the MVC do not signify a legislative intent to preclude constables from being equated with police officers in all other parts of the MVC. The general definitions of section 102 could not be abrogated, sub silentio, in that manner, and full effect may be given to sections 102 and 4571 as I have outlined above. The General Assembly’s express enactments are the clearest manifestation of its intent, and exceptions are not meant to swallow general rules. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1921, 1933, 1936.

It is worth reiterating that under section 102 of the MVC, a general proposition for the entire title is that a constable is a “police officer,” subject to specific exclusions or the clear context of a particular section. Neither the MVC as a whole, nor section 4571, contain any exclusions or alternative definitions, and the Majority is unable to cite any.

Even if we could reasonably construe sections 102 and 4571 as being in conflict, the general definition of a “police officer” in section 102 would still have to prevail over an implicit exception in section 4571. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1933. At the time Appellant was stopped on June 15, 2021, the version of section 4571 then in force was effective as of December 18, 2018. See 2018, Oct. 19, P.L. 547, No. 83, § 2, effective in 60 days [Dec. 18, 2018]. The version of section 102 then in force was effective as of a later date, on February 1, 2021. See 2020, Nov. 1, P.L. 1064, No. 106, § 1, effective in 90 days [Feb. 1, 2021].

It follows that the broader statute, section 102, must trump section 4571 even under the Majority’s flawed construction. The same is true as to all of the purportedly inconsistent MVC sections cited by the Majority in which police officers and constables were listed separately. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1376; 3102; 6309; 6309.1 (enacted in 2017; 2015; 2005, and 2005, respectively).7

Absurd or Unreasonable Results

The Majority attempts to undermine the reasonableness of Appellant’s interpretation by suggesting that it would lead to an “absurd” outcome, but I believe the opposite is true. According to the Majority, the General Assembly has, on the one hand, explicitly authorized constables to direct traffic, issue orders to motorists, and make warrantless arrests; but on the other hand, the Majority supposes that the General Assembly also has implicitly deprived constables of the right to mount red and blue emergency lights.

Our caselaw recognizes that emergency lights may often be the only reasonable and narrowly tailored means available for law enforcement “to render assistance or mitigate the peril” of a motorist. See Commonwealth v. Livingstone, 174 A.3d 609, 631 (Pa. 2007) (citation omitted). “It is undeniable that emergency lights on police vehicles in this Commonwealth serve important safety purposes, including ensuring that the police vehicle is visible to traffic, and signaling to a stopped motorist that it is a police officer, as opposed to a potentially dangerous stranger, who is approaching.” Id., at 621.

Motorists are required to “comply with any lawful order or direction of” a constable, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3102, and constables “shall perform all duties authorized or imposed on them by statute,” 44 Pa.C.S.A. § 7151. A constable’s statutory obligation to perform its duties of traffic control, and to make arrests, will necessarily implicate the concerns raised in Livingstone. See id. Accordingly, it is the Majority’s interpretation of sections 102 and 4571 which leads to a patently absurd result. The General Assembly would not have expressly authorized constables to carry out numerous law enforcement and traffic-related tasks if it had implicitly intended to deprive constables of the means of performing those duties safely. See id.8

Conclusion

A constable is authorized “by law” to make arrests for violations of law, satisfying the definition of “police officer” in section 102 of the MVC. Constables must therefore be classified as “police officers” for the purposes of section 4571 in that title, and a constable’s vehicle must in turn be classified as a “police vehicle,” which can be equipped with emergency lights.

In upholding the trial court’s contrary ruling, I believe the Majority has improperly employed our rules of construction. The MVC and our rules of construction are clear on these points, and even if there were an interpretation of the statutes that might not favor Appellant, that would both violate the rule of lenity and lead to absurd results. Thus, I must respectfully dissent.

2026 PA Super 126 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

STEVEN AHMAD WIGGS :

Appellant : No. 641 MDA 2023 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 3, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Perry County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-50-SA-0000026-2021 BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and BECK, J.

OPINION BY BOWES, J.: FILED: JUNE 17, 2026

Steven Ahmad Wiggs appeals from the judgment of sentence of a $500 fine imposed after he was found guilty at a de novo trial of a summary offense for having red and blue lights on his personal vehicle, which he used while acting as a constable. We affirm.

On June 15, 2021, Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) Trooper Jacob Brown-Shields observed a “fully marked black and white [C]rown [V]ic[1] style

constable vehicle” that was “equipped with a light bar on top.” N.T. Summary Appeal, 4/3/23, at 7, 9. Having received a report of Appellant using a vehicle with flashing red and blue lights a couple of weeks prior, Trooper Brown- Shields followed the vehicle, verified that it was registered to Appellant, and initiated a traffic stop. Appellant, who was armed and dressed in a self-styled uniform, insisted to the trooper multiple times that “constables are police officers” and he was “allowed to have red and blue lights.” Id. at 9. In similar fashion, Appellant had outfitted his personal vehicle with yellow striping, an image of the Pennsylvania coat of arms, and signage indicating “State Constable” and “Emergency 911.” Id. at Exhibit D-3.

Since Appellant professed to being “embarrassed about being pulled over” while acting as a constable, Trooper Brown-Shields permitted Appellant to activate his lights to appear as though he was working in an official capacity with the trooper instead of being stopped by him. At a subsequent hearing, the trooper testified that although almost two years had passed from the date of the stop, he “believe[d]” Appellant took him up on this offer, and that in doing so visually confirmed that the lights flashed red and blue. Id. at 9.

Furthermore, Appellant conceded that the lights were red and blue when he explained to Trooper Brown-Shields that the PSP had previously seized the same vehicle and cited Appellant for having red and blue lights on it. After the citation was dismissed for reasons unknown to this Court, the PSP returned the vehicle to Appellant with the red and blue lights intact. Despite the PSP asking him to remove the red and blue lights, Appellant told the trooper that he had refused to do so because he had won the case as to whether he could use such lights. Id. at Exhibit D-2 (time stamp 7:45-9:08).

As will be discussed at length infra, the Vehicle Code specifies at 75 Pa.C.S. § 4571(b)(1) the types of vehicles that are permitted to have red and blue flashing lights. Trooper Brown-Shields determined that Appellant’s vehicle was not one authorized by the statute and cited him for violating that provision. Id. at 12-14. After a Magisterial District Judge (“MDJ”) found Appellant guilty, he appealed to the Perry County Court of Common Pleas. Appellant filed a pre-trial motion challenging the legality of the stop and the deletion of the trooper’s mobile video recording prior to discovery, which was denied. Thereafter, Appellant proceeded to a de novo trial. Trooper Brown- Shields testified, and Appellant introduced photographs of his vehicle and a twenty-two minute audio recording he had made during the stop. At the conclusion, the court found Appellant guilty and imposed fines and the costs of prosecution.

This appeal followed. Appellant complied with the court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, and the court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion

addressing the claims raised by Appellant. In this Court, Appellant has refined his issues to the following four questions:

1. Statutory Construction: Does the Statutory Construction Act lead to a holding that [Appellant]’s car was a “police vehicle,”

as that two-word phrase is used in the applicable statute, 75 Pa.C.S. § 4571 (through its definitions section, § 102)?

2. Void for Vagueness Doctrine: If the two-word phrase “police vehicle” is interpreted as not including a constable’s marked vehicle (of the particular type that is the subject of the instant case), does convicting a constable (convicting him of an offense for which having a “police vehicle” is a complete defense) cause a due process violation (as applied to that particular type of vehicle), under the “void for vagueness” doctrine, under either the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and/or the Constitution of the United States of America?

3. Wrong Charge: When a person is convicted under the wrong subsection of a statute, is that conviction void?

4. No Evidence: When the color of the allegedly red[ and ]blue lights on a constable’s police car is an essential element of the alleged offense, and when there is zero evidence of the color of the lights in a light bar which is off, is that conviction void? Appellant’s brief at 8 (cleaned up).2

I.

Appellant first challenges the court’s interpretation of the Vehicle Code as prohibiting him from equipping his personal vehicle with red and blue flashing lights because he is a constable. He accepts that § 4571(b)(1) does not explicitly authorize constable vehicles to utilize such lights. Instead, he argues that “[a] constable vehicle is a police vehicle [because] a constable is a police officer.” Id. at 11 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). Under this argument, since police vehicles are permitted to have red and blue lights, he claims that, as a constable, he cannot be found guilty of a summary offense for having them on his personal vehicle.

This issue requires us to interpret § 4571 to determine whether Appellant’s vehicle was authorized to exhibit such lights. As this presents a question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. See Vellon v. Dep’t of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 292 A.3d 882, 890 (Pa. 2023). Statutory interpretation is, of course, conducted in accordance with the Statutory Construction Act:

Pursuant to that Act, “[t]he object of all statutory interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). When the words of a statute are clear and free from ambiguity, the letter of the statute is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b). When, however, the words of a statute are not explicit, a court may discern the General Assembly’s intent by examining considerations outside of the

words of the statute. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c). In addition, when construing a statute, we must, if possible, give effect to all of its provisions. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). Id. at 890 (citations altered).

In interpreting the operative word or phrase, we first examine the statute itself for a definition. However, the lack of a definition does not render the term ambiguous. See Commonwealth v. Phillips, 344 A.3d 360, 368 (Pa. 2025). In other words, we do not switch to the tools reserved for statutory construction of ambiguous statutes simply because the statute does not define the implicated term. Rather, “we ascertain the plain meaning of a statute by ascribing to the particular words and phrases the meaning which they have acquired through their common and approved usage, and in context.” Commonwealth v. Gamby, 283 A.3d 298, 306 (Pa. 2022) (cleaned up). In doing so, “we are able to, inter alia, consult the dictionary, which is one tool that this Court uses to apprehend a term’s plain meaning.” Phillips, 344 A.3d at 368 (cleaned up); see also Gamby, 283 A.3d at 307 (“To discern the legislative meaning of words and phrases, our Court has on numerous occasions engaged in an examination of dictionary definitions.” (cleaned up)). Only in instances where the words of a statute are not explicit, or are ambiguous, do we consider the construction factors enumerated in 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c).” Gamby, 283 A.3d at 306 (cleaned up).

With these principles in mind, we turn to the statute at issue in the case sub judice. Appellant was convicted of violating § 4571 of the Vehicle Code

for possessing red and blue flashing lights on his personal vehicle. That section provides as follows, in pertinent part:

(a) General rule.--Every emergency vehicle shall be equipped with one or more revolving or flashing red lights and an audible warning system. Spotlights with adjustable sockets may be attached to or mounted on emergency vehicles.

(b) Police, sheriff, fire and coroner or medical examiner vehicles.--

(1) Police, sheriff, coroner, medical examiner or fire police vehicles may in addition to the requirements of subsection

(a) be equipped with one or more revolving or flashing blue lights. The combination of red and blue lights may be used only on police, sheriff, coroner, medical examiner or fire police vehicles.

(2) Unmarked police and sheriff vehicles used as emergency vehicles and equipped with audible warning systems shall be equipped with the lights described in this subsection.

(d) Vehicles prohibited from using signals.--Except as otherwise specifically provided in this section, no vehicle other than an emergency vehicle may be equipped with revolving or flashing lights or audible warning systems identical or similar to those specified in subsections (a) and (b). A person who equips or uses a vehicle with visual or audible warning systems in violation of this section commits a summary offense and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than $500 nor more than $1,000. 75 Pa.C.S. § 4571 (footnote omitted, emphases added). Section 4571(b)(1) expressly authorizes five classes of vehicles to have red and blue flashing lights: police vehicles, sheriff vehicles, coroner vehicles,

medical examiner vehicles, and fire police vehicles.3 These types of vehicles are not defined, but consistent with the rules of statutory interpretation, we ascribe to them their common usage. Conspicuously absent is any reference to the private vehicles of independent contractors such as constables. See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 81 A.3d 103, 108 & n.10 (Pa.Super. 2013) (holding that constables must privately purchase and insure their own vehicles, which are not government vehicles, and are therefore not exempt from the Vehicle Code’s window tinting restrictions).

In considering the import of this list of vehicles, we note that our High Court has explained that the omission of a particular alternative from a statute indicates that the legislature intended to exclude it. For example, in

Thompson v. Thompson, 223 A.3d 1272 (Pa. 2020), the Court considered whether 23 Pa.C.S. § 4345 authorized suspended sentences as punishment for not complying with a child support order, reasoning as follows: Our interpretative analysis of [§] 4345(a) is straightforward, as there is no ambiguity in the statute. Section 4345(a) provides three express punishments for a support obligor who is found to be in contempt for noncompliance with a support order: (1) imprisonment for a period of up to six months; (2) a fine of up to $1,000; and (3) probation for a period of up to one year. 23 Pa.C.S. § 4345(a). It unequivocally provides that “[c]ontempt shall be punishable by any one or more” of the three alternatives it sets forth in subsections (a)(1)-(3), and it conspicuously does not include language imparting any discretion on a trial court to impose any other form of punishment, including a suspended sentence of incarceration. The omission of language condoning the imposition of suspended sentences speaks volumes, as it effectively prohibits trial courts from imposing them for civil contempt of a child support order. Long established maxims of statutory construction compel this result. Under the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, “the inclusion of a specific matter in a statute implies the exclusion of other matters.” See, e.g., Atcovitz v. Gulph Mills Tennis Club, Inc., 812 A.2d 1218, 1223 (Pa. 2002). Similarly, this Court has long recognized that as a matter of statutory interpretation, “although one is admonished to listen attentively to what a statute says; one must also listen attentively to what it does not say.” See, e.g., Kmonk-Sullivan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 788 A.2d 955, 962 (Pa. 2001). Applying these maxims, if the General Assembly intended to permit trial courts to impose suspended sentences for civil contempt of a child support order, it would have expressly provided for this alternative. It did not. We cannot ignore this exclusion. Because suspended sentences are not statutorily authorized as punishment for non-compliance with a child support order, they are illegal and may not be imposed. Thompson, 223 A.3d at 1277-78 (emphases in original, citations altered). Section 4571 unequivocally limits usage of red and blue flashing lights to “police, sheriff, coroner, medical examiner or fire police vehicles.” 75

Pa.C.S. § 4571(b)(1). While these vehicles are not statutorily defined, consistent with the rules of interpretation, we ascribe to them their common usage in the context of the emergency lighting provision. Such a reading confirms that constable vehicles are not encompassed within any of those vehicles. Therefore, the plain language of the statute, which patently omits constable vehicles from the list, reveals that our legislature did not intend to permit constable vehicles to be equipped with such lights. See Thompson, 223 A.3d at 1277-78.

Insofar as Appellant argues that his personal vehicle is a police vehicle, we cannot agree. As noted, although not defined within the statute, using common sense and reason, we surmise that a police vehicle is a vehicle owned by a police department for use by police officers in their official capacity as such. It does not include the personal vehicles of police officers for their own private use. As noted hereinabove, constables are not even granted government vehicles. As independent contractors, they must personally procure and insure their own vehicles to use when carrying out their duties. See Rodriguez, 81 A.3d at 108 & n.10. While we concede and laud the important work of our constabulary, it requires significant mental gymnastics to read into § 4571(b)(1) the conclusion that our General Assembly intended for a personally-owned vehicle of an independent contractor to be considered a police vehicle so as to display red and blue lights that only five specific types of vehicles are permitted to use.

Stated simply, § 4571(b)(1) expressly delineates the classes of vehicles that are allowed to use red and blue flashing lights, and Appellant’s personal vehicle is neither expressly listed nor encompassed by any of the enumerated types of vehicles. Thus, pursuant to the plain language of the statute, his first issue accords him no relief.

II.

In a vacuum, our discussion of Appellant’s first issue would necessitate no further discussion. We have applied the principles of statutory interpretation and, finding the statute unambiguous on its face, determined the legislature’s intent through the plain language of the statute and without resorting to the rules of construction. However, we must address Appellant’s argument, which relies upon the premise that instead of pertaining to classes of vehicles, § 4571(b)(1) applies to the use of vehicles by certain classes of persons. In that vein, he maintains that a constable is a police officer, and therefore his personal vehicle constitutes a police vehicle for purposes of § 4571(b)(1). In other words, Appellant contends that he is entitled to outfit his personal vehicle with red and blue flashing lights as a police vehicle because he, as a constable, is a police officer.

This argument fails for two reasons. First, as detailed above, § 4571(b)(1) pertains to certain classes of vehicles, not to the categories of

drivers.4 As it relates to the instant matter, our legislature conspicuously excluded vehicles utilized by constables from the list of vehicles allowed to use red and blue flashing lights. Therefore, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s logic.

Second, as will be discussed further infra, Appellant’s declaration that a constable is a police officer for purposes of the Vehicle Code is not supported by either the clear language of that act or by the rules of statutory interpretation.

Unlike “police vehicle,” the Vehicle Code defines “police officer” in another section, in the following manner:

Subject to additional definitions contained in subsequent provisions of this title which are applicable to specific provisions of this title, the following words and phrases when used in this title shall have, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, the meanings given to them in this section:

“Police officer.” A natural person authorized by law to make arrests for violations of law. 75 Pa.C.S. § 102 (emphasis added).5

Our Supreme Court has interpreted this definition thusly:

[F]acially, the provision applies broadly to anyone with a power of arrest. Under the Statutory Construction Act, however, we presume that the General Assembly did not intend unreasonable results. In this circumstance, a literal reading of the Vehicle Code’s definition of “police officer” would invest enforcement authority in all citizens, in light of their common-law arrest power.

It is manifest, however, that the Legislature did not intend to denominate the citizenry at large as “police officers” or confer vehicle-related enforcement authority upon it. Thus, we find that the Legislature’s definitional reference to the authorization “by law to make arrests for violations of law,” 75 Pa.C.S. § 102, refers to some form of legal authorization beyond a mere common-law power shared among Pennsylvania citizens. Commonwealth v. Marconi, 64 A.3d 1036, 1041 (Pa. 2013) (citations omitted). Based on the foregoing, the Supreme Court held that sheriffs and their deputies did not qualify as police officers within the Vehicle Code. Id. Consistent with this differentiation between sheriffs and police officers in the Vehicle Code, sheriff vehicles are specifically listed within § 4571(b)(1) as one of the select vehicles, in addition to police vehicles, authorized to equip red and blue flashing lights.

Turning to whether constables are encompassed within the Vehicle Code’s definition of “police officer,” we recognize that, like sheriffs, and indeed

all citizens, constables possess common law arrest powers. In addition, though, they have statutory authority to effect certain limited arrests.6 See, e.g., 44 Pa.C.S. § 7158 (providing that constables may arrest an individual who: “(1) Is guilty of a breach of the peace, vagrancy, riotous or disorderly conduct or drunkenness[;] (2) May be engaged in the commission of any unlawful act tending to imperil the personal security or endanger the property of the citizens[; or] (3) Violates any ordinance of the borough for which a fine or penalty is imposed.”). Notably, our Supreme Court held that constables lack statutory authority to conduct traffic stops to enforce the Vehicle Code. See Commonwealth v. Roose, 710 A.2d 1129, 1130 (Pa. 1998).

As prescribed at the outset of § 102, the pertinent definition of “police officer” is context-specific to the Vehicle Code, and subject to the other definitions set forth within that act. Consistent with that legal construct, the General Assembly lists constables and police officers separately within the Vehicle Code.7 See, e.g., 75 Pa.C.S. § 1376(b)(1), (5) (indexing individually

“[l]ocal police officers” and “[c]onstables or deputy constables” as those who may be delegated the authority to seize surrendered registration plates); 75 Pa.C.S. § 3102 (requiring compliance with the traffic direction of “any uniformed police officer, sheriff or constable”); 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 6309, 6309.1 (discussing impoundment by “police officer, sheriff or constable”).

The General Assembly’s distinctive treatment of constables and police officers within the Vehicle Code is critical. First, pursuant to the principle of statutory interpretation known as expressio unius est exclusio alterius, it highlights that the General Assembly deliberately excluded a constable’s vehicle from § 4571(b)(1) as it explicitly listed constables alongside police officers in other provisions. Second, although Appellant purports to include constables as police officers in one part of the Vehicle Code, the remainder of the act reveals that they are often treated separately. We deem this particularly relevant given the mandate of § 102 that the definition of “police

officer” is subject to the other provisions of the Vehicle Code, as well as the tenets governing statutory interpretation. Stated differently, constables and police officers are treated distinctly both within the context of the statute and in their common usage.

In short, we cannot simultaneously give the General Assembly’s distinction between constables and police officers credit, and yet determine that it neglected to list constable vehicles in § 4571(b)(1) because it implicitly considers constables as police officers such that constable vehicles are subsumed within the phrase “police vehicles.” If constables were police officers pursuant to the definition in § 102, there would be no need to list constables separately from police officers in §§ 1376(b), 3102, 6309, and 6309.1.8 Indeed, sheriffs are similarly listed discretely in three of these

sections, but unlike a constable’s vehicle, the legislature specifically included sheriff vehicles in the short list of vehicles authorized by § 4571(b)(1) to utilize red and blue flashing lights.9 Thus, we reject Appellant’s argument that a

constable is a police officer for purposes of the Vehicle Code, and we hold that a constable cannot invoke the authorization afforded to police vehicles to equip his personal vehicle with red and blue flashing lights.

Once more, “we find nothing in the plain reading of the statutory language to be unclear or ambiguous, and, as such, we do not resort to other principles of statutory construction to elicit the meaning of the phrase.” Phillips, 344 A.3d at 368 (cleaned up). Nonetheless, we are compelled to address Appellant’s arguments. Unpersuaded by the fact that the statutory language does not explicitly include constables within the definition of a police officer, Appellant valiantly advances his argument that the statute must implicitly include constable vehicles within the characterization of police vehicles by pointing to our Supreme Court’s statement in a footnote that “[t]he constable is a police officer” in In re Act 147 of 1990 (“In re Act 147”), 598 A.2d 985, 990 n.3 (Pa. 1991). See Appellant’s brief at 19. Thus, we must also explain why this proposition fails, , which necessitates various forays into areas we would not otherwise discuss.

First, the In re Act 147 statement is wholly inapplicable to the matter before us in that the case from which it derives did not involve the Vehicle Code or touch upon the limited issue before us in this matter. Rather, that case addressed the issue of where constables belonged within our governmental system for purposes of oversight and accountability. Our Supreme Court ultimately categorized constables as executive branch officials.

Since Act 147 had placed constables within the judicial hierarchy, the Court found the act unconstitutional. Thus, In re Act 147 is simply inapt. Second, the High Court’s statement that a “constable is a police officer” must be considered in the proper context. Notably, it appeared in a footnote as a reference to the comic opera, The Pirates of Penzance. In full, the phrase relied upon by Appellant appears thusly: Simply stated, a constable is a peace officer.3 A constable is a known officer charged with the conservation of the peace, and whose business it is to arrest those who have violated it. By statute in Pennsylvania, a constable may also serve process in some instances. As a peace officer, and as a process server, a constable belongs analytically to the executive branch of government, even though his job is obviously related to the courts. It is the constable’s job to enforce the law and carry it out, just as the same is the job of district attorneys, sheriffs, and the police generally.[10] Act 147 is unconstitutional and violates the separation of powers doctrine in our Constitution because it attempts to place constables within the judicial branch of government and under the supervisory authority of the judicial branch. . . . At most, constables are “related staff” under the Rules of Judicial Administration. They cannot, however, be made part of the judicial branch under our Constitution. To attempt to do so constitutes a gross violation of the separation of powers. Personnel whose central functions and activities partake of exercising executive powers cannot be arbitrarily made part of another branch of government whose functions they do not perform. To do so interferes with the supervisory authority of the

Supreme Court just as much as attempting to dictate how that authority is to be exercised over personnel who are properly part of the judicial system. In consequence, we find Act 147 unconstitutional and invalid.

demonstrate certain physical fitness standards before entry into the training program. Once admitted, trainees undergo 919 hours of classroom and practical instruction, including forty hours on the operation of emergency vehicles and 124 hours on firearms. Additionally, a trainee must pass with a score of at least 80% on various exams throughout the program, including a driving skills test, before being eligible to take the 200-question certification exam to become a police officer. See Physical Fitness, available at https://www.pa.gov/agencies/mpoetc/programs/training/basic-police-officer -training/physical-fitness.html; see also Municipal Police Officer Basic Training Program, 2024, available at https://www.pa.gov/content/dam/ copapwp-pagov/en/mpoetc/documents/training/basic-police-officer-training/ curriculum_overview_2024.pdf); see also MPOETC 2022 Basic Police Syllabus, available at https://www.pa.gov/content/dam/copapwp- pagov/en/mpoetc/documents/training/basic-police-officer-training/basic%20 police%20training%20syllabus.pdf.

On the other hand, constables undergo only eighty hours of basic training and forty hours of firearms instruction, with the requirement that they achieve a passing score of at least 70% on each written exam. See 44 Pa.C.S. § 7145 (“The Constables’ Education and Training Program shall include training for a total of [eighty] hours, the content of which shall be determined by regulation. The training shall include instruction in the interpretation and application of the fees provided for in [§] 7161 (relating to fees).”);

Constables’ Education and Training, available at https:// www.pa.gov/agencies/pccd/programs-and-services/training/public-safety- training/cetb-training.html. Therein, the only training pertinent to the use of a vehicle is four hours of instruction about prisoner transport and how to reduce the possibility of an escape. See Constables’ Education and Training.

We do not extrapolate from the High Court’s footnote and operatic allusion any equivalency between constables and police officers for purposes of the Vehicle Code and the employment of red and blue flashing lights on their vehicles. Instead, we heed the warning of our Supreme Court regarding “the necessity of reading legal rules—especially broad rules—against their facts and the corollary that judicial pronouncements should employ due modesty.” Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 328, 378 (Pa. 2014). The Court adopted “the principle that the holding of a decision is to be read against its facts” precisely because “it is very difficult for courts to determine the range of factual circumstances to which a particular rule should apply in light of the often myriad possibilities.” Maloney v. Valley Med. Facilities, Inc., 984 A.2d 478, 490-91 (Pa. 2009). In doing so, the Court echoed the sentiment of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals that “[j]udicial opinions are frequently drafted in haste, with imperfect foresight, and without due regard for the possibility that words or phrases or sentences may be taken out of context and treated as doctrines.” Id. (cleaned up).

Consistent with this approach, a panel of this Court previously grappled with the import of In re Act 147’s statement about the role of constables:

The Supreme Court’s statement that “a constable is a peace officer” was merely express recognition of a well-settled legal principle. See e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) (defining “peace officers” to include “sheriffs and their deputies, constables . . . and other officers whose duty it is to enforce the peace.”), and 6A C.J.S. Arrest, § 17 (“Justices, sheriffs, coroners, constables and watchmen are recognized peace officers at common law.”). Lastly, 16 P.S. § 1216, Peace officers; powers and duties, expressly applies to constables.

Moreover, following its statement that “a constable is a peace officer,” the Court inserted a footnote which provides, “[t]he constable is a police officer.” In re Act 147 of 1990, 598 A.2d at 990. Instantly, the Commonwealth asserts that this statement constitutes Supreme Court recognition that constables possess “the same authorities and duties” as police officers under all circumstances. We flatly reject this claim. Specifically, when read in the context in which it was uttered, the Court’s statement indicates that the powers of constables and police officers are coextensive in matters relating to “conservation of the peace.” Id. Further, as the remainder of the Court’s opinion indicates, its notation that “[t]he constable is a police officer” was intended as further support for the Court’s ultimate conclusion that “a constable belongs analytically to the executive branch of government.” Id. Therefore, since Act 147 did not involve the relative arrest powers of constables and police officers, the Court’s statement cannot be taken as a blanket endorsement of constable powers coextensive with those of police officers under all circumstances. Finally, the Court’s finding that constables are independent contractors . . . clearly indicates that the Court did not consider constables and police officers analogous for all purposes, since Pennsylvania law has never characterized police officers as independent contractors. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 677 A.2d 846, 847 n.6 (Pa.Super. 1996) (cleaned up).

It is plain to us that the In re Act 147 Court was not considering whether constables were police officers for purposes of the types of lights permitted on their cars under the Vehicle Code. Rather, it was contemplating within which branch of government constables fit, and concluded that, as peace officers with responsibilities similar to those of district attorneys, sheriffs, and police officers, they fell within the executive branch. As such, we will not take the aforementioned footnote out of context and manipulate it to fit Appellant’s desired outcome. See Maloney, 984 A.2d at 490.

Finally, even if the language of the statute was ambiguous, which it is not for the reasons outlined in Part I supra, we would not be persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that a constable is a police officer and therefore he may outfit his constable vehicle with any lights permitted to be equipped on a police vehicle. Read “in the light of reason and common sense,” § 4571(b)(1) intended to restrain use of red and blue lights to those government vehicles operated by specifically-delineated officials with either the authority to enforce the Vehicle Code or a particular responsibility in responding to serious emergencies. See Vellon, 292 A.3d at 890 (cleaned up); 75 Pa.C.S. § 4571 (limiting the usage of red and blue lights to “police, sheriff, coroner, medical examiner or fire police vehicles”). Constables lack the authority to do either. Thus, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments and instead adhere closely to the text of the statute, which plainly omits personal vehicles from red-and-blue-light authorization.

III.

Before turning to Appellant’s remaining claims, we feel compelled to respond to the Dissenting Opinion, which lambasts us for purportedly “improperly appl[ying] the rules of statutory construction [and] ignor[ing] plain statutory definitions and cherry-pick[ing] inapplicable exceptions, thwarting legislative intent.” Dissenting Opinion at 2. As it appears our esteemed colleague has misread this Opinion, we include this section to assuage some of the concerns raised thereby.

First, we must correct the Dissent’s framing of this case. In its opinion, the Dissent identifies the sole issue as being whether “a constable . . . could be cited for violating [§] 4571(d) of the . . . Vehicle Code . . . due to having flashing red and blue lights mounted on his vehicle, when such lights are only permitted on specified ‘emergency vehicles,’ as defined in the [Vehicle Code.]”11 Dissenting Opinion at 1-2 (footnote omitted). This is a misreading of the statute. Certainly, § 4571(d) references the broad term emergency vehicles, but it does so because it encompasses violations of both § 4571(a), authorizing red lights on emergency vehicles, as well as § 4571(b), which limits the usage of red and blue lights to five subsets of emergency vehicles. Appellant’s vehicle is prohibited from using red and blue signals not by virtue

of not being an emergency vehicle, but because it is not one of the five enumerated vehicles that is allowed to equip red and blue lights pursuant to § 4571(b). Therefore, the question is not whether Appellant’s vehicle is an emergency vehicle, but, more narrowly, whether it is one of the five vehicles listed in § 4571(b)(1). As explained supra, it patently is not.

The Dissent avers that we improperly employ rules of statutory construction, such as considering other statutes on similar topics, to discern the legislature’s intent despite finding that § 4571 is unambiguous.12 See Dissenting Opinion at 12. In our principal analysis of Appellant’s first issue, we acknowledge that we discuss 23 Pa.C.S. § 4345. See supra at 8-9. However, we do not do so pursuant to any rule of construction to discern the legislature’s intent within § 4571. Rather, it is mentioned only to give context to our explanation of the legal maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which was detailed by the Thompson Court when discussing its statutory interpretation of the unambiguous language of § 4345.13

The only other references appear in Part II of this Opinion, which is an alternative analysis disposing of Appellant’s contention that a constable vehicle is a police vehicle because he assumes a constable is a police officer. As detailed in that section, it is clear that this premise is faulty and cannot overcome the plain language of § 4571. Nonetheless, as Appellant and the Dissent espouse otherwise, we felt obligated to address it. In doing so, we cited other statutes merely to emphasize the distinction between constables and police officers in the Vehicle Code, outline the differences in how they are trained given Appellant’s equation of the two positions, and to address a request in one of the amicus briefs to use the definition of “police officer” from the Dog Law. See supra at 14 n.7; id. at 20-22; id. at 12 n.5.

In further assault upon our writing, the Dissent alleges that we deemed the language unambiguous but then proceeded to construe the meaning of § 4571 as if it were ambiguous by looking at “the consequences of particular interpretations, and the object to be attained by the statutes’ enactment.” Dissenting Opinion at 12-13. As an illustration, the Dissent contends that “[a] central theme of [our] opinion is that the General Assembly intended to prohibit constables from mounting emergency lights” because they are trained differently than police officers and have different responsibilities. Id. at 13 n.4. While we do not disagree that our decision demonstrates the differences between constables and police officers, our focus is not upon the vehicles the General Assembly sought to prohibit from using such lights, but whether Appellant’s vehicle falls within the enumerated list of authorized vehicles.

Insofar as it can be inferred that we erroneously applied a rule of statutory construction to an unambiguous statute in rendering our decision, it would have only been in response to Appellant’s insistence that a constable is a police officer, and therefore his private vehicle is a “police vehicle.”

Finally, our esteemed fellow jurist proclaims that we “attempt. . . to undermine the reasonableness of Appellant’s interpretation by suggesting that it would lead to an ‘absurd’ outcome,” and in doing so, emphasizes the need for constable vehicles to utilize “emergency lights” in order “to carry out numerous traffic-related tasks[.]” Id. at 21-23. It may well be that constable vehicles can invoke the authorization given to other types of vehicles in the Vehicle Code to use a variety of colored lights to aid in their traffic-related duties. However, whether Appellant’s vehicle was entitled to use the red lights of emergency vehicles or some other unspecified kind of light is not the question before us. The question is whether his vehicle could specifically use the emblematic red and blue lights preserved only for police vehicles, sheriff vehicles, coroner vehicles, medical examiner vehicles, and fire police vehicles. Once again, the answer to that question is that § 4571(b)(1) does not list any vehicle that would encompass Appellant’s, and therefore he was prohibited from placing red and blue lights on his personal car.

To summarize, at no point do we rest our analysis upon an application of the rules of statutory construction rather than interpretation, not even when addressing Appellant’s contrived arguments. We look simply at the plain language of the text, which conspicuously omits constable vehicles from the

list of those authorized to exhibit red and blue lights. A constable vehicle, which is necessarily a private vehicle of an independent contractor, is simply not a “police vehicle.” Even if we were to concern ourselves with who is driving the vehicle in question to determine what type it is, which we decidedly do not except in response to Appellant’s argument, constables are not police officers for purposes of the Vehicle Code. Besides an obscure reference to a comedic opera in a Supreme Court decision on a completely different issue, there has been no suggestion that a constable is a police officer. A constable may dress like a police officer, carry a weapon like a police officer, have some arrest powers like a police officer, and paint his car to look like a government-issued police vehicle, but that does not mean he is a police officer and, as is the most important point in this case, it does not mean that his personal car may have red and blue lights.

If our reading of the plain text has somehow mistaken the legislature’s intent and the General Assembly instead believes constables should be able to use red and blue lights on their privately-owned vehicles, it can amend § 4571(b)(1) to explicitly provide such authorization for that type of vehicle as it did for police vehicles, sheriff vehicles, fire police vehicles, coroner vehicles, and medical examiner vehicles. Until then, it is self-evident from the common understanding of the language of the statute that the private vehicles of constables are not among the limited vehicles allowed to employ red and blue lights. Therefore, Appellant was prohibited from placing them on his personal vehicle.

With that clarified, we move on to Appellant’s remaining issues.

IV.

Appellant next argues that § 4571(b)(1) is void for vagueness because it is subject to two “legally correct ways to read it[.]” 14 Appellant’s brief at 30. We review such a challenge de novo. See Commonwealth v. Davidson, 938 A.2d 198, 203 (Pa. 2007). The principles governing a void-for-vagueness claim are well-settled: Under the void-for-vagueness standard, a statute will only be found unconstitutional if the statute is so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. However, a statute will pass a vagueness constitutional challenge if the statute defines the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Due process requires that a criminal statute give fair warning of the conduct it criminalizes. Furthermore, even if the General Assembly could have chosen clearer and more precise language equally capable of achieving the end which it sought does not mean that the statute which it in fact drafted is unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 207–08 (cleaned up). Here, the Vehicle Code clearly lists which vehicles may utilize red and blue lights. As indicated, constable vehicles are not specified as one of those.

While Appellant and the Dissent have interpreted the statute differently than this Court, the trial court, the MDJ, and Trooper Bown-Shields, that does not mean that it has two equally plausible readings. A commonsense interpretation of the plain language of the Vehicle Code provides notice to lay individuals that only the vehicles explicitly listed may be outfitted with red and blue lights. The legislature was not required to add language explaining which vehicles were prohibited when it clearly delineated which ones were permitted. Since the statute is not vague, this claim fails.

V.

In his third issue, Appellant avers that he was convicted under the wrong subsection of § 4571. See Appellant’s brief at 34. Specifically, he contends that he was improperly charged with § 4571(a) and convicted of a violation of § 4571(b)(1), when he should have been charged and convicted of § 4571(d). To refresh, these subsections provide as follows:

(a) General rule.--Every emergency vehicle shall be equipped with one or more revolving or flashing red lights and an audible warning system. Spotlights with adjustable sockets may be attached to or mounted on emergency vehicles.

(b) Police, sheriff, fire and coroner or medical examiner vehicles.--

(1) Police, sheriff, coroner, medical examiner or fire police vehicles may in addition to the requirements of subsection

(a) be equipped with one or more revolving or flashing blue lights. The combination of red and blue lights may be used only on police, sheriff, coroner, medical examiner or fire police vehicles.

(d) Vehicles prohibited from using signals.--Except as otherwise specifically provided in this section, no vehicle other than an emergency vehicle may be equipped with revolving or flashing lights or audible warning systems identical or similar to those specified in subsections (a) and (b). A person who equips or uses a vehicle with visual or audible warning systems in violation of this section commits a summary offense and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than $500 nor more than $1,000. 75 Pa.C.S. § 4571. In addition to the discrepancy between the charging document and his conviction, Appellant maintains that he could only be convicted of subsection (d) because that is the provision that prohibited the relevant conduct. See Appellant’s brief at 35-37.

By way of background, Appellant was cited with a violation of subsection (b)(1) and convicted at the same subsection following a de novo appeal. Therefore, any complaint about the validity of his summary conviction before the MDJ was nullified by his appeal to the Court of Common Pleas for a trial de novo.

As to whether Appellant should have been charged with subsection (d) instead of (b)(1), we agree with the trial court’s explanation of the interplay between these subsections: “[I]t’s clear [§ 4571(d)] is what happens if you are convicted or in violation of [§] 4571(b)(1).” N.T. Summary Appeal, 4/3/23, at 44. Based on the foregoing, we discern no error in Appellant being charged with violating § 4571(b)(1) as he equipped red and blue lights to a vehicle that lacked statutory authorization. Having violated § 4571(b)(1), the

grading of his offense and the parameters of his punishment were set forth in § 4571(d). No relief is due.

VI.

Finally, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction because he contends that there was no evidence that the light bar, which was clear when not illuminated, contained red and blue lights. See Appellant’s brief at 38-40. He maintains that the lights were never activated and the trooper’s testimony indicated he was unsure whether he had observed the color of the lights. Id. at 39.

We review a claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence pursuant to these well-established legal principles:

In reviewing sufficiency of evidence claims, we determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, and all the reasonable inferences derived therefrom viewed in favor of the Commonwealth as verdict winner, supports the jury’s findings of all the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. A sufficiency challenge is a pure question of law. Thus, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Jacoby, 170 A.3d 1065, 1076 (Pa. 2017) (cleaned up).

While understandably not without some qualification due to the intervening two years, Trooper Brown-Shields testified that it was his recollection that he permitted Appellant to turn on his lights during the traffic stop and that, when he did so, it confirmed that the lights were red and blue.

Additionally, the trooper attested that Appellant conceded the light bar

contained red and blue lights, and asserted that he was permitted to have them.

Although it is unclear from the audio recording whether Appellant in fact illuminated his lights during the stop, the recording confirms that the trooper gave him the option to turn on his lights so he would feel less embarrassed about being pulled over in his constable vehicle. Nothing in the recording contradicts the trooper’s testimony that Appellant opted to activate his lights.

More importantly, the audio evidence corroborated the trooper’s testimony that Appellant himself conceded the color of the lights. As noted at the outset, Appellant stated during his conversation with Trooper Brown- Shields that the PSP had previously seized the same vehicle for having red and blue lights. He explained that he was cited for a violation of § 4571, but the citation was ultimately dismissed and the vehicle returned to him with the red and blue lights still affixed. Appellant boasted that when asked to remove the lights thereafter, he refused to do so because he had won the case. See Exhibit D-2 at 7:45-9:08. Therefore, Appellant himself confirmed that the lights were still the same red and blue ones. Indeed, Appellant reported that whenever there is a disabled vehicle on the road or he observes a breach of the peace and the troopers are not on scene, “my lights are on.” Id. at 21:20- 21:35. At no point did Appellant indicate that his lights were anything other than red and blue. Rather, he emphatically insisted throughout the encounter that he was entitled to have red and blue lights on his vehicle because he was a police officer.

Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to prove that Appellant’s light bar emitted red and blue flashing lights in violation of § 4571(b)(1). Accordingly, Appellant’s sufficiency challenge fails.

VII.

In light of the foregoing, we discern no reason to overturn Appellant’s summary conviction. Therefore, we affirm his judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judges Olson, Dubow, Kunselman, Nichols, Murray, McLaughlin, and Beck join this Opinion.

Judge Stabile files a Dissenting Opinion. Judgment Entered. Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 6/17/2026