Lawfare Against Pennsylvania Constables

Why This Conclusion Is Grounded in the Record

Pennsylvania's constables have served as locally elected peace officers since 1664. The concern presented here is not that every disagreement proves bad faith; it is that multiple institutions have advanced overlapping restrictions and arguments that, taken together, point in the same direction. The June 2026 en banc decision in Wiggs — reached after the Pennsylvania State Police and PCCD filed a joint amicus brief against the constable — is the clearest example yet: a single elected officer prosecuted for equipping his marked vehicle, and a court persuaded to read him out of a statutory definition the legislature wrote. Judge Stabile's dissent moves this concern out of the realm of rhetoric and onto the record, warning that executive actors are pressing against legislative grants they did not create. We think the dissent has the better of the argument, and the fight is not over.

Why Centralized Power Fears Constables

Constables are Pennsylvania's only directly elected statutory police officers. That distinction is precise, and it is the whole fight. Sheriffs are elected too — but their arrest authority is common-law, not granted "by law," so the Vehicle Code's definition of "police officer" (75 Pa.C.S. § 102) has never reached them. Municipal and state police are statutory police officers — but they are appointed, not elected. Constables alone are both: directly chosen by their neighbors and authorized by statute to make arrests. They are the only law enforcement officers in the Commonwealth who are accountable to voters and empowered by the legislature at the same time.

Constable authority is also foundational to the rest of Pennsylvania law enforcement. The Pennsylvania State Police (created 1905) was explicitly authorized to have "the powers and prerogatives conferred by law upon...constables of this Commonwealth." County detectives "shall have all the powers conferred by law upon constables." Philadelphia police, under the 1951 Home Rule Charter, hold the same derivation. These agencies did not invent their authority — they inherited it from constable law.

Today's attack on constables is not about public safety or professionalization. It is about severing the one office that combines an election and a statute — the office that makes law enforcement answer to communities rather than to Harrisburg. If constables disappear, state agencies no longer answer to locally elected officers. Communities no longer control who enforces the law. That is why the pressure is relentless and multifaceted.

Tactic 1: Prosecute Lawful Duty

Closed Philadelphia matters (2018–2022). Constable Steven Ahmad Wiggs performed his authorized law enforcement duties in Philadelphia. The Pennsylvania State Police prosecuted him for it — not because he did anything wrong, but because state agencies had decided constables should not be allowed to operate the way the legislature authorized. Across multiple dockets covering impersonation, firearms, and lights charges, every Philadelphia charge was dismissed, quashed, or resulted in a not-guilty verdict. The Court of Common Pleas ordered PSP to return his marked police vehicle, his firearms, and all property seized. A second constable, Douglas Filson, was tried de novo on summary appeal in November 2023 and found Not Guilty on the same statutory basis used to prosecute Wiggs (Commonwealth v. Filson, CP-46-SA-0000254-2023, Montgomery County C.P.).

The Perry County / Superior Court matter — and why we say it was wrongly decided. PSP cited Wiggs for equipping his marked constable vehicle with emergency lights while performing his duties. On June 17, 2026, the full Superior Court, sitting en banc, affirmed the conviction 8-1, holding that a constable's vehicle is not a "police vehicle" under 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 102 and 4571 (Commonwealth v. Wiggs, 2026 PA Super 126). We believe that decision is wrong — one more element of a concerted effort to read a directly elected, statutorily empowered officer out of the very definitions the legislature wrote to include him. Judge Stabile's dissent is our north star. As the dissent puts it: a legislature that authorizes constables to direct traffic and issue lawful orders to motorists cannot then deny them the equipment that lets those motorists recognize and respond to that authority. This is not the end of the road. Read the full case record ›

The two state agencies most responsible for constable certification and ORI eligibility — the Pennsylvania State Police and the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency — filed a joint amicus brief against the constable, urging a narrow interpretation of constable authority. (See Brief of Amici Curiae Pennsylvania State Police & Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency in Support of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Commonwealth v. Wiggs.) The two agencies that issue ORI numbers and administer training certification have, on the record, briefed against the office whose officers they are charged with credentialing.

What happens next. The fight moves on two tracks. First, a Petition for Allowance of Appeal asks the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to take the case and adopt the dissent's reading of the statute. Second, a targeted amendment to 75 Pa.C.S. § 4571(b)(1) would settle the question in the legislature — placing the constable's vehicle squarely within the emergency-vehicle framework the General Assembly already extended to the rest of Pennsylvania law enforcement. The judicial track asks the courts to read the existing law correctly; the legislative track removes any room to read it wrong. We are pursuing both. Here is how you can help ›

This is how you narrow an office without abolishing it. Prosecute constables for performing authorized duties. Persuade a court to shrink a statutory definition. Make the office expensive, frightening, and administratively exhausting. Eventually, people stop running for it — unless citizens push back.

Tactic 2: Make the Office Economically Unviable

Constables hold elected public office, yet receive no government salary, benefits, or reimbursement. The statutory fee schedule (44 Pa.C.S. § 7161) governs only constables' judicial duties — warrant service, civil process, prisoner transport for the courts, and similar court-directed work — and even there has not been updated to keep pace with cost. Constable activity outside the judicial fee schedule (training, public safety, election duty, contracted services) is not constrained or reimbursed by it. Across all sources, constables bear costs no other elected officer bears. They pay 15.3% self-employment tax on top of ordinary income taxes, with no employer contribution. From the same fee income, they pay for training, equipment, vehicle purchase and maintenance, and professional liability insurance (required by statute). Pennsylvania compounds this by issuing conflicting guidance on how to classify income across tax years, leaving newly elected constables — who ran for office in good faith — facing unexpected large tax liabilities at the end of their first year.

This is not incidental inequity. It is part of the strategy. Make the office so expensive that working people cannot afford to run for it. Make the tax burden so unpredictable that candidates face financial ruin. Eventually, only wealthy people run — or no one runs at all. Communities lose locally accountable law enforcement. State agencies fill the vacuum. That is the mechanism.

Tactic 3: Restrict Authority Via Litigation and Rulemaking

Constable authority is not a recent grant. It is the foundational law from which Pennsylvania's other agencies derive their own powers. When the legislature created the Pennsylvania State Police in 1905, it explicitly gave them "the powers and prerogatives conferred by law upon...constables of this Commonwealth." County detectives hold the same language. Philadelphia police hold the same derivation. These agencies are not peer-equal to constables — they are derivative from constable law.

Today, under 44 Pa.C.S. Chapter 71 and related statutes, constables hold: warrantless arrest authority for felonies and breaches of the peace; warrant execution for courts throughout the Commonwealth; civil process service; prisoner transport; courthouse security; election duty; and traffic-direction authority on equal statutory footing with police officers and sheriffs (75 Pa.C.S. § 3102). This is comprehensive, explicit, and unchanged for decades.

Yet state agencies argue — and in Wiggs persuaded an en banc court — that constables fall outside "police officer" and "police vehicle" status. That argument has to ignore a clear statutory pattern that places constables on functional parity with officers of other police agencies for core law enforcement duties. 75 Pa.C.S. § 102 defines "police officer" as a person "authorized by law to make arrests for violations of law." Read it closely: the words that matter are by law. A constable's arrest authority is conferred by statute, which is exactly what the definition demands — and exactly what separates constables from sheriffs, whose authority rests on common law rather than a statutory grant. The Vehicle Code explicitly names constables alongside police officers and sheriffs for traffic direction (75 Pa.C.S. § 3102). Other statutes establish reciprocity, making municipal police "ex-officio constables of the city" (11 Pa.C.S. § 12005) and deriving county detective powers from "the powers conferred on constables by the laws of this Commonwealth" (16 Pa.C.S. § 14340). Reading the directly elected, statutorily empowered constable out of these definitions requires ignoring the plain text of the laws that empower the rest of Pennsylvania law enforcement — which is precisely the point the Wiggs dissent makes.

State agencies further restrict arrest authority to home wards only, eliminate court-directed investigative duties, and remove constables from courthouse security. Each restriction, alone, looks minor. Together, they dismantle the office piece by piece through litigation and administrative reinterpretation. That is the slow elimination of local power.

Tactic 4: Use Regulatory Barriers to Price Out Local Candidates

Constables complete rigorous mandatory training — 80 hours of basic training, 40 hours of firearms training, 20 hours of annual recertification — all paid out of pocket. Many pursue additional certifications: active shooter response, tactical casualty care, search and rescue, domestic violence response, FEMA management. Constables pay for their own professionalization. That commitment is proven.

Yet agencies now propose mandating 750 or more hours of police-academy-style training — at a cost of thousands of dollars per constable. The purpose is explicit: price out working people who run for the office in good faith. If only wealthy people can afford to become constables, communities lose locally elected law enforcement. If no one runs, the office disappears. That is the mechanism.

The legislature grants statutory authority. If it intends to condition authority on specific training, it enacts that requirement. Agencies cannot use regulatory back doors to strip statutory powers. The sequence is fixed: authority from statute, then training. Agencies reversing that order are not reforming — they are eliminating.

Tactic 5: Consolidate Election Control

Pennsylvania law designates constables as the only law enforcement officers permitted inside polling places on Election Day. This is a deliberate design choice: election security rests with locally elected, non-partisan officers directly accountable to voters — not with state appointees answerable to the executive branch. Constables protect voters in both directions: they prevent illegal interference and ensure no qualified voter is wrongfully turned away. They report to their communities, not to Harrisburg.

This role is now under systematic pressure. Legislative proposals seek to replace locally elected constables with "election security officers" appointed by the Secretary of State. Other proposals would restrict constables inside polling places to passive observation only, stripping the authority the law already gives them. In jurisdictions with declining constable strength, the election-day role is being eliminated by administrative attrition.

The pattern is unmistakable: centralized power replaces local accountability. Communities no longer decide who ensures their ballots are counted. The state does. That is not election security. That is state control.

Tactic 6: Withhold the Information the Job Requires

A constable serving a warrant, transporting a prisoner, or standing by at a landlord-tenant eviction cannot check whether the person in front of them is wanted. Cannot check whether the vehicle in the driveway is stolen. That information sits in NCIC, the FBI's national database. In Pennsylvania you reach it through CLEAN, a system run by the Pennsylvania State Police. Access requires an ORI, an Originating Agency Identifier, the credential that identifies an agency to those systems. The State Police have refused, repeatedly, to issue constables one. Their own published CLEAN Administrative Regulations state the eligibility test for full access:

Full Access ORI's — Are authorized access to all NCIC 2000 files and the Interstate Identification Index (III). Such agencies are those meeting the definition of a Criminal Justice Agency in Title 18 Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, Chapter 91 (9102) and the United States Department of Justice definition of a Criminal Justice Agency, as contained in the Code of Federal Regulations (Title 28-Judicial Administration, Part 20).

That is the entire stated test. Read it again. It contains no training requirement. No certification requirement. No employment-standards requirement of any kind.

The clause everyone points to does not appear in that paragraph. The phrase about meeting "minimum employment standards of governmentally employed police officers" sits in a different paragraph of the same regulations, the one governing limited access. That paragraph opens with the words "Nongovernmental agency or subunit thereof." It is a condition on private applicants. A constable is an elected public officer. Under these same regulations, full access already goes to county Children and Youth caseworkers and to judges who hear domestic violence cases. Neither holds police certification. Neither makes arrests. The State Police are applying a standard their own regulation does not contain.

Constables meet the actual test. 18 Pa.C.S. § 9102 defines a criminal justice agency as a governmental agency created by statute, "specifically authorized to perform as its principal function the administration of criminal justice," which "allocates a substantial portion of its annual budget to such function." The constable office is created by statute, 44 Pa.C.S. Ch. 71. Its arrest authority comes first from the common law: every constable, township or borough, holds the peace officer's power to arrest without warrant for felonies and breaches of the peace and to keep the peace (In re Act 147, Taylor, Allen), and the General Assembly has codified that on-view power for boroughs in § 7158. The statute then specifically authorizes warrant execution, prisoner transport, courthouse security, and court-directed investigation, and a municipality that engages the office, township or borough, engages it to enforce its ordinances on that same authority. Section 9102's own list of qualifying agencies includes "district or prosecuting attorneys." In Pennsylvania a district attorney is a single elected officeholder, which answers the objection that a constable is an officer, not an agency. The closer parallel is the sheriff’s office: an elected officer, deputies appointed under statute, and the same arrest, warrant, custody, and transport work. A sheriff’s office appears in none of § 9102’s examples and is a criminal justice agency anyway, holding an ORI without any special declaration. A constable office with deputies under § 7122 is that office on a fee base, and funding source appears nowhere in the definition. The statute defines "administration of criminal justice" beginning with the prevention of crime. A civil standby or a peacekeeping detail is exactly that. Constables spend nearly the whole cost of holding the office on criminal justice work: vehicle, duty firearm and annual qualification, ammunition, body armor, restraints, uniforms, communications, liability insurance, mandated continuing education.

In June 2026 an en banc Superior Court held in Commonwealth v. Wiggs that a constable is not a "police officer" under the Vehicle Code. That decision is wrongly decided and on appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. It does not reach this question. Section 9102 is a different statute, in a different title, with a different definition. That definition has no "police officer" element. It covers probation agencies, which make no arrests. It covers prosecutors, who make no arrests. Whatever happens in the Vehicle Code fight, the database question stands on its own ground. Section 9102 also permits the Attorney General to declare an agency a criminal justice agency. The clause is additive: a declaration confirms what the statute already provides, and one letter could confirm it for the entire class of constables at once.

A constable serving a warrant is standing at a door without knowing whether the person behind it is wanted for a violent felony. The information exists. The State Police have it. They grant access to agencies that never make an arrest. They withhold it from the elected officer at the door. Withholding it does not make anyone safer. It puts the constable, and the people inside that house, at avoidable risk. The regulation sets a functional test. The statute sets the same test. Constables meet it. The State Police say no.

There is more, and it is on its own page. Two lists obtained from the Office of Attorney General show that the Attorney General, not the State Police, is the authority that declares an entity a criminal justice agency under § 9102, and has done so more than sixty times: for two public defender’s offices with no arrest power, a crime victims compensation board, a state lottery director’s office, a student loan fraud unit, one state park, and more than twenty university and hospital police forces, most of them private. The State Police’s own written explanation for denying constables, a 21-page document produced under the Right-to-Know Law, inverts a Supreme Court holding, denies investigative authority that is printed in Title 44, and describes two incompatible cases under the name Wiggs, one of them ending in the voice of an automated research tool. We have graded it claim by claim.

Read the full ORI campaign page › Read 18 Pa.C.S. § 9102 ›

Defend Local Power

This is not a technical dispute. It is a fight for who controls law enforcement in your community. Constables answer to voters. State agencies answer to Harrisburg. If constables disappear, so does local accountability. After Wiggs, the path forward is clear on both fronts: the Pennsylvania Supreme Court can correct the courts, and the General Assembly can correct the statute with a single amendment to 75 Pa.C.S. § 4571(b)(1). Neither happens without constituents demanding it.

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Most Pennsylvanians do not know that centralized authorities are systematically dismantling locally elected law enforcement. Share this page so your neighbors understand what is at stake — and why constables matter to their freedom.

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